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Abstract—Due to increasing concerns of data privacy, databases
are being encrypted before they are stored on an untrusted server.
To enable search operations on the encrypted data, searchable en-
cryption techniques have been proposed. Representative schemes
use order-preserving encryption (OPE) for supporting efficient
Boolean queries on encrypted databases. Yet, recent works showed
the possibility of inferring plaintext data from OPE-encrypted
databases, merely using the order-preserving constraints, or com-
bined with an auxiliary plaintext dataset with similar frequency
distribution. So far, the effectiveness of such attacks is limited
to single-dimensional dense data (most values from the domain
are encrypted), but it remains challenging to achieve it on high-
dimensional datasets (e.g., spatial data) which are often sparse in
nature. In this paper, for the first time, we study data inference
attacks on multi-dimensional encrypted databases (with 2-D as a
special case). We formulate it as a 2-D order-preserving matching
problem and explore both unweighted and weighted cases, where
the former maximizes the number of points matched using only
order information and the latter further considers points with
similar frequencies. We prove that the problem is NP-hard, and
then propose a greedy algorithm, along with a polynomial-time
algorithm with approximation guarantees. Experimental results
on synthetic and real-world datasets show that the data recovery
rate is significantly enhanced compared with the previous 1-D
matching algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data outsourcing has become popular in recent years. Small
businesses or individual users choose to delegate their data
storage to public cloud servers (such as Amazon EC2 or Google
Cloud) to save operational costs. Meanwhile, data breaches
happen at an increasing rate, which compromise users’ privacy.
For instance, the Yahoo! data breaches reported in 2016 affected
3 billion user accounts [1]. This is exacerbated by recent
scandals of data misuse (such as the Facebook-Cambridge
Analytica case [2]), which increases the level of distrust from
users. To address this issue, end-to-end encryption is commonly
adopted to encrypt the data before it is uploaded and stored on
an untrusted server. In order to enable efficient utilization over
encrypted data (such as answering queries), many cryptographic
techniques called searchable encryption (SE) [3], [4], [5] have
been proposed. The main challenge for SE is to simultaneously
provide flexible search functionality, high security assurance,
and efficiency. Among existing SE schemes, Order-Preserving
Encryption (OPE) [6], [7], [8], [9] has gained wide attention
in the literature due to its high efficiency and functionality. In
particular, OPE uses symmetric key cryptography and preserves
the numeric order of plaintext after encryption, which supports
most Boolean queries such as range query. Well-known systems
for encrypted database search using OPE include: CryptDB
[10], Google Encrypted Bigquery Client [11], and Microsoft
Always Encrypted Database [12].
Many early OPE schemes, unfortunately, were shown to
leak more information beyond what is necessary (i.e., the
order between plaintexts). Therefore, schemes that satisfy ideal
security guarantees (that only the order is leaked) have been
proposed [8], [9]. However, recent research [13], [14] showed
that it is possible to infer/recover a significant portion of
plaintexts from their OPE ciphertext, using only the ciphertext
order relationships, as well as some auxiliary dataset with data
frequencies similar to a target dataset. For example, Naveed et
al. [13] attacked an encrypted medical database where users’
age column is encrypted using OPE. Later, the attack was
improved by Grubb et al. [14], with an additional restriction
of non-crossing property in the matching algorithm.
We note that, to date, all the successful inference attacks
against OPE are limited to one-dimensional data [13], [14].
That is, even though a database may have multiple numeric
columns/dimensions, where each of them being encrypted by
OPE, each of these columns are treated separately when they
are matched with plaintext values. This works well for dense
data, i.e., where most of the values from the whole data
domain have corresponding ciphertexts present in the database,
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such as age [14]. Intuitively, the denser the data is, the more
effective the attack is, because more constraints imposed by the
ciphertext order reduces the uncertainty of their corresponding
plaintext values. However, for multi-dimensional databases,
applying such 1-D matching algorithms on each dimension
separately can yield results far from optimal, since it neglects
that for each pair of data tuples the order-preserving constraints
on all the dimensions must be held jointly, leading to a much
larger search space than the actual one and therefore more
ambiguity in matching. In addition, for higher dimensional
data (such as spatial/location data), the data tuple tends to
be increasingly sparsely distributed in the domain, which in-
validates the one-dimensional matching approach (unless the
ciphertext and known plaintext datasets are highly similar with
each other). Therefore, we wonder whether it is still feasible
to recover OPE-encrypted data tuples for multi-dimensional,
sparse databases? This turns out to be a very challenging
problem.
In this paper, we study data inference attacks against multi-
dimensional encrypted databases by jointly considering all the
dimensions and leveraging only the ciphertext tuples’ order
and frequency information, with the help of an auxiliary
plaintext dataset with similar frequencies (the same assumption
is adopted by many previous works). We formulate the order-
preserving matching problem first in 2D but later extend it to
3D and higher dimensions. In the unweighted case, given an
OPE-encrypted database and an auxiliary plaintext dataset, each
containing a set of points in 2D, we maximize the number of
points in a matching from the ciphertext to the plaintext, where
order-preserving property must be simultaneously satisfied in
both dimensions. Such a matching is called a non-conflicting
matching in which the x/y projection of one edge in the
matching cannot contain the projection of another edge in the
matching. In general we also consider point frequency (the
number of records with the same value), points matched with a
smaller frequency difference are given higher weights and we
maximize the total weights of the matching.
We show that our problem can also be formulated as
an integer programming problem (ILP), and prove its NP-
hardness by reducing it to sub-permutation pattern matching
problem. Then we propose a greedy algorithm, along with an
approximation algorithm with O(n2.5 log3 n) runtime and an
approximation factor of O(
√
n). This algorithm exploits the
geometric structure of the problem, which is based on the idea
of finding jointly heaviest monotone sequences (i.e., sequence
of points with either increasing or decreasing order on each
dimension) inside the auxiliary and target datasets. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
study data inference attacks against multi-dimensional OPE-
encrypted databases by jointly considering all the dimensions
simultaneously. We formulate a 2-D order-preserving matching
problem and show its NP-hardness.
(2) We design two 2-D order-preserving matching algo-
rithms, including a greedy and a polynomial time algorithm
with approximation guarantees. We consider both unweighted
and weighted cases, with different weight functions. We further
explore efficiency enhancement using tree-based data struc-
tures. We also discuss extensions to higher dimensions. These
algorithms have independent interest beyond the applications
in this paper.
(3) We evaluate the efficiency and data recovery rate of
our algorithms over both synthetic and real-world datasets
for different application scenarios, including location-based
services, census data, and medical data. Our results suggest that
when the ciphertext dataset is highly similar to a subset of the
plaintext dataset, the greedy min-conflict algorithm performs
the best; but, in general, when these two datasets have arbitrary
intersections and are less similar, our monotone matching
algorithm performs better. Overall, the recovery rate of our 2-D
algorithms significantly outperform single-dimensional match-
ing algorithms when the data is sparse in each dimension.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Order-Preserving Encryption
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) [8] is a special encryp-
tion, where the order of ciphertexts is consistent with the order
of plaintexts. For instance, assume there are two plaintexts
(m1,m2) and their OPE are ciphertexts (Jm1K, Jm2K), whereJmiK is the encrypted version of mi by following the common
notations in previous studies [8], [14]. If m1 < m2, thenJm1K < Jm2K. With such property, comparison and sorting
could be performed on encrypted data directly, without the
need to access plaintext. While some OPEs are probabilistic
and only reveal the order of data items [9], probabilistic
OPEs increase the ciphertext size or require client-size storage,
which scale poorly on sparse data. Most efficient OPEs are
deterministic, and thus also reveal the frequency of data items
[8]. In this paper, we focus on inference attacks on deterministic
OPEs.
B. Inference Attacks on OPE via 1-D Matching
While the security of OPEs has been proved formally under
Ordered Chosen-Plaintext Attacks [8], several studies propose
inference attacks to evaluate the privacy leakage of OPE cipher-
texts. For instance, Naveed, et al. [13] proposed an inference
attack, named cumulative attack, on 1-D OPE by leveraging
frequency leakage only. The authors address the attack by
running the Hungarian algorithm. Grubbs et al. designed [14]
leakage abuse attacks on 1-D OPE ciphertexts. The authors
utilize both frequency and order leakage, and formulate the
attack as a dynamic programming problem [14]. This leakage
abuse attack performs faster than the cumulative attack and
derives higher recovery rate. We briefly describe this leakage
abuse attack below.
Given an OPE-encrypted dataset A = {Ja1K, Ja2K, ..., JanK}
and an unencrypted dataset B = {b1, b2, ..., bm} similar to A,
an attacker tries to infer the plaintexts of A without decrypting
OPE ciphertexts, by leveraging the plaintexts of B as well as
the order and frequency information of A and B. Without loss
of generality, the attack assumes that A and B are sorted, where
JaiK < JajK for any i < j, and bk < bl for any k < l. The
attacker also assumes n ≤ m. Let FA(JaK) and FB(b) be the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the OPE ciphertexts
of dataset A and the plaintexts of dataset B respectively. Now,
construct a bipartite graph H on vertex set A, B, in which the
weight of an edge between vertex JaiK and vertex bj is defined
as
w(JaiK, bj) = κ− |FA(JaiK)− FB(bj)|
where κ is a pre-defined parameter and can be any integer
greater than 1.
The attacker finds a max-weight bipartite matching in H that
is (one-dimensional) order-preserving (i.e., a vertex early in A
is mapped to an early vertex in B). Intuitively, suppose we plot
the points of A and B on two parallel lines in their order. If we
draw the edges in the matching, these edges could not cross.
That is, if JaiK and bj are matched, any vertex in JakK with k <
i cannot be matched with vertex b` with ` > j. Therefore, such
a matching is also called a non-crossing matching. The max-
weight non-crossing matching can be found in time O(mn)
via dynamic programming. If vertex bj is matched with vertexJaiK, this attacker infers bj as the plaintext of OPE ciphertextJaiK.
C. Other Attacks on Encrypted Databases
In addition to cumulative attacks and leakage abuse attacks,
some other attacks have also been proposed against OPE. Durak
et al. [15] proposed sort attacks on 2-D data encrypted by
OPE. This attack performs a non-crossing matching on each
dimension separately, and then improve the recovery results
by evaluating inter-column correlation. Bindschaedler et al.
[16] proposed an inference attack against property-preserving
encryption on multi-dimensional data. This attack operates
column by column. Specifically, it first recovers the column
encrypted with the weakest encryption primitive, and then infers
the next column encrypted by a stronger primitive by consider-
ing correlation. The attack is formulated as Bayesian inference
problem. It also leverages record linkage and machine learning
to infer columns that are strongly encrypted. In comparison,
our proposed matching algorithms aim at optimally recover
data tuples containing two or more dimensions as a whole.
We utilize the order and frequencies of the 2-D tuples, instead
of single-dimension order and frequency in previous works. In
addition, we do not need explicit prior knowledge about the data
correlations across dimensions within an encrypted dataset.
Finally, reconstruction attacks [17], [18] recover plaintexts on
any searchable encryption that support range queries. Different
from inference attacks, a reconstruction attack does not require
a similar dataset as a reference but recover data based on access
pattern leakage from a large number of range queries. However,
reconstruction attacks often assume range queries are uniformly
distributed, except [19], which is based on statistical learning
theory. These works are orthogonal to this work.
In this paper, we design two 2-D order-preserving matching
algorithms that jointly consider the data ordering on 2D. We
also extend the the 1-D matching algorithm in [14] to 2-D data
for comparison. It turns out all the algorithms have advantages
and limitations, as we describe in the evaluation and conclusion
sections.
III. MODELS AND OBJECTIVES
System Model. In the system model, there are two entities,
a client and a server. We assume that a client has a dataset
(e.g., a location dataset) and needs to store it on the server.
Due to privacy concerns, this client will encrypt the dataset
before outsourcing it to the server.
We assume that the client encrypts the data using determin-
istic OPE, such that the server will be able to perform search
operations (e.g., range queries) over encrypted data without
decryption. We assume that each dimension of the data is
encrypted separately with OPE, such that search can be enabled
for each dimension. The client’s data set is denoted as Q and
its encrypted version as JQK.
Threat Model. We assume that the server is an honest-but-
curious attacker, who is interested in revealing the client’s data
but does not maliciously add, modify, or remove the client’s
data. In addition, we assume that the server is able to possess
a similar dataset P (in plaintext) as the client’s dataset. In
addition, we assume that P and Q have a significant common
data points. For those points in Q that are also contained in
P , they have similar frequency distributions. For example, Q
can be the location data from Uber users, and P can be a
USGS spatial database (Q can be considered to be randomly
sampled from P ). Or P and Q can be two location check-
in datasets from two different social networking apps with
partially overlapping locations.
Objectives. The attacker’s goal is to perform inference
attacks to maximally infer/recover the plaintext of encrypted
database JQK without decryption, using only JQK and P with
the ciphertext/plaintext order, either with or without frequency
of points in both datasets. He aims at recovering the database
points exactly. We define the recovery rate as the primary
metric to measure the privacy leakage of the inference attack.
Recovery rate: If an attacker infers n points, m′ of which
are correct inference (the same as their true plaintext points),
then the recovery rate is m′/n. In addition, we consider both
the unweighted version of the above metrics, where each unique
point/location is counted once, or the weighted version where
the frequency is considered as well (number of ‘copies’ of the
same point, e.g. the number of customers in a restaurant). The
former can be regarded as “point-level” and the latter is “record-
level”. Intuitively, to maximize the weighted recovery rate, the
points with larger frequencies should be correctly matched with
high priority.
IV. 2-D ORDER-PRESERVING MATCHING
We formulate an order-preserving matching problem in two
dimensions. Let P and Q be two finite sets of points in the
plane. P = {p1, p2, · · · , pn} and Q = {q1, q2, · · · , qm}. If
p ∈ P is matched to q ∈ Q, we denote it as an edge (p, q)
and sometimes also denoted as p↔q. We say that a matching
M between P and Q is order preserving if there exist two
monotone functions ψ, φ such that if (p, q) ∈ M (for p ∈
P, q ∈ Q) then q.x = ψ(p.x), q.y = φ(p.y).
It is convenient to consider an alternative, equivalent way to
define order preserving, in terms of “conflicts”. We say that two
edges (p, q) ∈M and (p′, q′) ∈M are in x-conflict with each
other if the x-projection (interval) of one edge contains the x-
projection (interval) of the other edge; the notion of being in y-
conflict is defined similarly. We say that a matchingM is a non-
conflicting matching of P and Q if it does not contain any x-
conflicting or y-conflicting pair of edges. From the definitions,
it is easy to see that a matching M is order preserving if and
only if it is a non-conflicting matching.
q1
p1
p2
p3
q2
q3
Fig. 1: In this matchingM between P = {p1, p2, p3} and Q =
{q1, q2, q3}, the edge (p2, q2) is in y-conflict with edge (p1, q1)
and in x-conflict with edge (p3, q3).
We say that a point p′ dominates p′′, and write p′′ ≺ p′,
if either (i) p′′.x < p′.x, or (ii) p′′.x = p′.x and p′.y < p′′.y.
With this notation, two pairs (pi, qj), (pi′ , qj′) with pi′ ≺ pi
but qj ≺ qj′ are in conflict.
A. Unweighted v.s. Weighted Version
In this paper we study the problem of finding a maximum
cardinality, or a maximum-weight order preserving matching.
In the unweighted version, we maximize the number of edges
in a non-conflict matching between P and Q. This formulation
does not use information on data frequencies.
To incorporate knowledge on data frequencies from P and Q,
we can define weight of matching a point in P with a point in
Q and ask for the non-conflict matching with maximum weight.
The goal is to minimize the total difference of the frequencies
between each ciphertext and its matched plaintext points. Note
that this may or may not be equivalent with the objective of
maximizing the recovery rate. This depends on the similarity
of the two datasets P and Q: when the frequencies of the same
points are close in either dataset, max-weight matching will
likely maximize recovery rate.
There are several possible choices of weight function. As-
sume f(pi), f(qj) are the frequencies of locations (resp. )
pi ∈ P, qj ∈ Q. Then the weight of matching pi to qj could be
one of the following weight function:
1) weight(pi↔qj) = min{f(pi), f(qi)}. The rational for
this weight function is that if we consider f(pi) and f(qj)
as indicating the normalized number of items at point pi
and qj , then min{f(pi), f(qi)} indicates the maximum
number of items could be matched.
2) weight(pi↔qj) = κ − |f(pj) − f(qj)| , where κ is
a manually-picked constant, usually as maximum of all
f(qi) and f(qj). This is the cost function used in [14].
B. Integer Programming Formulation
Given two sets of points, P and Q, we define a variable
xij that takes value 1 if pi↔qj and 0 otherwise. Now, we can
formulate our matching problem as follows:
Maximize
∑
i,j
xij · w(pi↔qj)
Subject to
∑
j
xij ≤ 1, ∀i∑
i
xij ≤ 1, ∀j
xij + xi′j′ ≤ 1, ∀(i, j), (i′, j′),
s. t. (pi, qj) is in conflict with (pi′ , qj′).
The first two constraints imply that one point can only be
matched to one other point. The last inequality is the non-
conflicting constraint.
C. Related Results on Maximum Independent Sets
Our problem can be phrased as a (weighted) maximum
independent set (MIS) problem, in the conflict graph, defined
below.
Conflict Graph GConf(P×Q,EConf): the graph whose nodes
are pairs of potentially matched points, one from P and one
from Q, and whose edges represent the conflict relationship:
(u, v) ∈ EConf if the matched point pair u ∈ P × Q is in
conflict with the matched point pair v ∈ P ×Q.
Unfortunately, this graph in our settings is enormous, and its
node set has cardinality quadratic in the size of the input. Thus,
pursuing our problem as a maximum independent set problem
is likely impractical. In general, MIS has no polynomial-time
constant factor approximation algorithm (unless P = NP );
in fact, MIS, in general, is Poly-APX-complete, meaning it
is as hard as any problem that can cannot be approximated
within a polynomial factor [20]. However, there are efficient
approximation algorithms for restricted classes of graphs. In
planar graphs, MIS can be approximated to within any ap-
proximation ratio c < 1 in polynomial time; MIS also has
a polynomial-time approximation scheme in any family of
graphs closed under taking minors [21]. In bounded degree
graphs, effective approximation algorithms are known with
approximation ratios that are constant for a fixed value of the
maximum degree; for instance, a greedy algorithm that forms a
maximal independent set by, at each step, choosing a minimum-
degree vertex in the graph and removing its neighbors, achieves
an approximation ratio of (∆ + 2)/3 on graphs with maximum
degree ∆ [22]; hardness of approximation for such instances is
also known [23], and MIS on 3-regular 3-edge-colorable graphs
is APX-complete [24].
V. NP-HARDNESS
The problem of finding a maximum-cardinality order pre-
serving matching (i.e., the unweighted case) is NP-hard. There-
fore the weighted setting is also NP-hard.
We establish this by using a reduction from the prob-
lem PATTERN MATCHING PROBLEM FOR PERMUTATIONS
(PMPP) [25], which asks the following: Given a permutation
T = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) of the sequence (1, 2, . . . , n) and a per-
mutation S = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) of the sequence (1, 2, . . . , k),
for k ≤ n, determine if there exists a subsequence, T ′ =
(ti1 , ti2 , . . . , tik), of T of length k (with i1 < i2 < · · · < ik)
such that the elements of T ′ are ordered according to the
permutation S, i.e., such that tij < tij′ if and only if sj < sj′ .
We map a PMPP input pair of permutations, (T, S), to a
pair of points, (P,Q), in the plane: Specifically, P is the
set {(i, ti) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} of n points corresponding to the
permutation T , and Q is the set {(i, si) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} of
k points corresponding to the permutation S. It now follows
from the definition of an order preserving matching, and the
specification of the PMPP, that there exists an order preserving
matching of size k between P and Q if and only if there is a
subsequence T ′ of T of length k such that the elements of T ′
are ordered according to the permutation S. It follows that our
(unweighted) order preserving matching problem is NP-hard.
Theorem V.1. Given two point sets P,Q ⊂ R2, it is NP-
complete to decide if there exists an order preserving matching
M of cardinality min{|P |, |Q|} between P and Q.
VI. ALGORITHMS
A. Greedy Minimum-Conflict Matching
In this heuristic, we create an order preserving matching
M⊆ P ×Q in a greedy manner. We start with M empty, and
at each iteration we add to M the edge that has the minimum
number of conflicted edges among all potential future edges that
could be selected. This heuristic is reminiscent of the minimum-
degree heuristic of Halldo´rsson and Radhakrishnan [22] that
shows that similar heuristics provide a (∆+2)/3 approximation
for finding a maximum independent set in graphs having
maximum degree ∆; however, in our setting, ∆ might be
Ω(|P ||Q|), making this bound uninteresting.
Formally, define for p ∈ P, q ∈ Q
s(p, q) =
∑
{w(p′, q′)
∣∣∣(p′, q′) conflicts with (p, q) but
not with edges currently in M}
and greedily select (p∗, q∗) to minimize s(p, q). A straightfor-
ward algorithm computes s(p, q) directly (in time O(n2)) for
each of the O(n2) candidate edges (p, q), in order to select
each edge to be greedily added to M. Overall, this is O(n4).
1) Unweighted Case: Here, to expedite the algorithm to
avoid the time O(n4) (per edge selected), we propose a
weighted random sampling approach. We could find (p∗, q∗)
in amortized time O(1) per pair (pi, qj). This is done in two
steps: We first compute for each pi the number n −→(pi) of
point p ∈ P above and to the left of pi. Similarly we define
n −→(pi), n
−→
(pi), n
−→
(pi) and m −→(qj), m
−→
(qj), m
−→
(qj). Then
the number of matching edges that are in conflict with (pi, qj)
can be computed by evaluating the products n(pi) ·m(qj),
where  is one of the 4 directions −→, −→, −→ ,
−→
. As easily
observed, the number of conflicts is
s(pi, qj) = n
−→(pi)m −→(qj) + n −→(pi)m −→(qj)
+ n
−→
(pi)m
−→
(qj) + n
−→
(pi)m
−→
(qj)
= nm−
∑
∈ −→, −→,
−→
,−→
mi n

i
We pick the edge minimizing this expression. Of course,
once one edge is picked during the greedy matching algorithm,
these numbers need to be recomputed, since multiple edges are
not valid anymore.
We note that after the first iteration, when partial matching
M is not empty, the values of ni ,mj reflects only edges not
violating edges of M. However, computing these values for
every pi, qj in time O(n2) is straightforward.
2) Weighted case: We propose two basic methods.
Random sampling: We consider all n2 potential edges, P×Q,
compute the weight of each, and pick a random sample R of
(expected) size k, where the probability of picking (p, q) is
k
w(p, q)∑
p′,q′ w(p
′, q′)
Next, we greedily find a min-violation edge, with the violation
computed with respect to R only. So the expected running time
for this stage is O(n2k2) per edge added to M.
This method can be enhanced further, for weight-function
(1), where the weight function is computed with respect to a
random sample of vertices picked according to their weight.
ε-approximation via scaling algorithm. For the weight func-
tion (1) (w(pi, qj) = min{f(pi), f(qj)}), a faster approach is
proposed.
Let wmin, wmax be the minimum weight and maximum
weight. Consider the logarithmic number of levels {wmin(1 +
ε)i} for every i such that wmin(1+ε)i ≤ wmax. At the i’th step,
we consider only the vertices with weight ≥ wmin(1+ε)i, find
the number ζi of edges conflicting (p, q) using the unweighted
O(n2) algorithm, and sum the (rescaled) values
∑
(1 + ε)iζi
as an estimation of s(p, q). It is easy to see that an (unscaled)
edge conflicting (p, q) will be counted once, with its weight
error bounded by a factor of (1 + ε).
B. Greedy via Monotone Sequences
Given P , we say that a sequence (p1, p2, , , pk) is an mono-
tone increasing sequence if pi.x ≤ pi+1.x and pi.y ≤ pi+1.y,
for all i. Then, a subset P ′ ⊆ P is said to be a monotone
increasing subset if the sequence obtained by ordering P ′ by
x-coordinates is a monotone increasing sequence. Analogously
we define sequences and subsets that are monotone decreasing.
In the previous section we discussed methods to greedily
augment the matching by a single edge. One might wonder if it
is possible, and whether it is more efficient, to add a collection
of edges at each time. For example, Dynamic Programming
proved useful in the 1-D case, and it is tempting to apply it
for the 2-D case as well. However, applying similar techniques
for the 2-D case seems very challenging. It is extremely hard
to define sub-problems which are independent on each other,
in the sense that the solution of one does not depend on the
solution to another. However, with a non-trivial hint on the
approximation we obtain, we could define such a solution for
monotone sequences. Refer to Algorithm 1 for the pseudo-code.
Essentially, if we opt to match p ∈ P to q ∈ Q, then any
decisions taken on the quadrant below and to the left of p
could not (in an order-preserving matching) affect matching in
the quadrant opposite this quadrant, consisting of points above
and to the right of p. Similar observations hold for every pair
of opposite quadrants. This observation suggests our search for
monotone sequences.
Formally a sequence P ↑ = {p1 . . . pk} ∈ P is an increas-
ingly monotone sequence if pi ≺ pi+1. (for i = 1 . . . k − 1).
Decreasing sequences are defined analogously. Obviously if in
a matching M, pi is matched to qi ∈ Q then the sequence
{q1 . . . qk} is increasingly monotone as well. The heaviest
monotone sequence is a monotone sequences maximizing the
sum of weights of its edges. Given a partial matching M,
we describe in this section an algorithm that finds monotonic
sequences P ↑ ⊆ P and Q↑ ⊆ Q, a matching between them
that does not conflict with M and is of maximum weight.
We use this algorithm as follows: In iterations we find an
optimal monotonically (increasing or decreasing) sequences
with respect toM, include the corresponding matched edges to
M and continue. Therefor we concentrate on efficient imple-
mentation of finding a single monotone matching. We discuss
the case of monotonically increasing sequences. The case for
monotonically decreasing sequences is handled analogously.
Let X = P × Q = {(pi, qj)
∣∣pi ∈ P, qj ∈ Q}. By
abusing notation, we also consider each (pi, qj) as a point in
R4, with coordinates (pi.x, pi.y, qi.x, qi.y). We first describe
the algorithm when X lies in R4, and then show that we
could orthogonally project X into R3, and handle all querie as
orthogonal three-dimensional range queries. For a point pi ∈ P
we define P≺pi = {p ∈ P | |p is dominated by pi}. For
(p, q), (p′, q′) ∈ X we say that (p′, q′) dominates (p, q), and
write (p, q) ≺ (p′, q′) iff p ≺ p′ and q ≺ q′. Similarly for
µ = (p, q) (for p ∈ P, q ∈ Q), we write w(µ) to denote
the weight of the matching edge (p, q). Fix µ = (pi, qj). We
define c[µ] to be the maximum sum of weights of edges in any
maximum increasing monotone matching by using only points
of P≺pi to points of Q≺qj and ending at µ.
To obtain a fast asymptotic running time, we will use
Algorithm 1. We maintain a 4-D orthogonal range tree T (X )
[26]. Each leaf in the tree is associated with a node in X . Each
internal node η ∈ T is associate with
1) A range Rη which is a rectangle in R4.
2) A subset Xη ⊆ X which include all points of X inside
Rη .
3) The point µ∗ ∈ Xη, which is the last point of the heaviest
monotone sequence ending at µ∗, for µ∗ ∈ Xη .
4) c(η) — the weight of this sequence.
The idea is to use an Orthogonal Range search data structure
for the points in X . We scan these points in topological
increasing order, so if µ ≺ µ′ then we access µ′ after accessing
µ. This will guarantee that c(µ) is fully computed at this point.
Lemma VI.1. We could preprocess X into a data struc-
ture T such that the preprocessing time and space are both
O(n2 log4 n), given a query axis-parallel rectangle R ⊆ R4,
we could find a set of O(log4 n) nodes Ξ = {η1 . . . ηk} of T ,
each corresponds to a subset Xηi ⊆ X that is fully contained
in R, and each is associated with a value c[µi] which is
max{c[µ′] | µ′ ∈ Xηi}
Next we notice that filtering points of X based on their first
coordinate is not necessary. That is, we only need to store each
point of (p, q) ∈ X using only (p.y, q.x, q.y), since a query on
other regions yields that the result is zero, and will not effect
the query time nor the correctness.
Lemma VI.2. So the data structure is in R3. Hence the query
time of Lemma VI.1 is improved to O(log3 n). The space
requirement also drops to O(n2 log2 n).
Proof. Since all weights are positive, and the points of P are
accessed in increasing x order lexicographically, then once
accessing c((pi, qj)), its value is strictly positive only due to a
point p′ ∈ P such that p′.x ≤ pi.x. Therefor there is no need
to filter nodes of T based on their very first coordinate.
While orthogonal range trees are almost optimal theoreti-
cally, they suffer from several drawbacks. The space required
is super-linear, and in practical applications, they tend to be
inferior to other hierarchical spatial data structures as kD-trees.
The latter could be applied with linear memory, and faster
search time on realistic data.
Lemma VI.3. Instead of the orthogonal range tree, if we use
a 3-dimensional kD-tree, the space requirement will be linear,
while the asymptotic running time per a query will increase to
O(|X |(1−1/d)) = O((n2)2/3) = O(n4/3).
Running time and correctness : Given a partial matching
M, it takes O(n2 log3 n) to find the heaviest (max-weight)
monotone matching not conflicting M . At this point these edges
are added to M , and the process repeats. Since P could be
decompose into ≤ √n monotone sequences [27], the number of
iterations is ≤ √n. The overall running time is O(n2.5 log3 n),
and the space is O(|P ||Q| log2 n). Here n = max{|P |, |Q|}.
C. Lower bounds
It is interesting to note that improving the bound below
Ω(n2) is unlikely, given that even if the points are on a
line, then our problem is quite similar to the edit distance
problem, and LCS problems, for which recent lower bounds
are proven under the SETH assumption [28]. Hence we are
only logarithmic distance away from the claimed optimum.
D. Approximation guarantees
Lemma VI.4. Let opt be the maximum weight of the max-
imum order-preserving matching. Then by using the mono-
Algorithm 1: Finding heaviest increasing monotone chain
1 Input: P and Q (sorted in an increasing order), and a partial
matching M⊆ P ×Q ;
2 Init: Initialize the an orthogonal range search T for X ,
3 and set c(η) = 0, ∀η ∈ T .
4 for i = 1 to |P | do
5 for j = 1 to |Q| do
6 if µ = (pi, qj) does not conflict any edge in M then
7 Set the range (rectangle)
8 R = {(−∞, pi.y)× (−∞, qi.x)× (−∞, qi.y)}
9 Perform a range query in T with the range R to
obtain a set Ξ = {η1 . . . ηk} of O(log3 n) nodes
in T
/* Each ηi ∈ Ξ corresponds to a
region fully contains in R. */
10 Let µ∗ be arg max{c(η)|η ∈ Ξ}
11 Set c(µ) = w(pi, qj) + c(µ∗)
12 for each η′i ∈ T ancestor of µ do
13 Set c(η′i) = max{c(η′i), c(µ)}
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 end
tone sequences algorithm we obtain a matching of weight
≥ opt/√min{|P |, |Q|}.
Proof. Consider any partition of P into monotone sequences.
By the classical results of Paul Erdo¨s and George Szekeres
[27] t ≤ √n. Let M∗ be the set of all these edges, and let
M∗|P↑i be the set of edges with one endpoint in P
↑
i (for every
1 ≤ i ≤ l). Since the sum of all matched edges in M∗ is
opt, the sum of all edges M∗|P↑i must be ≥ opt/l. This cost
is obviously not larger than the maximum we find along any
monotone sequence.
E. Extension to Multi-Dimensional Data
Extending our matching algorithms to handle three or more
dimensional data is well-motivated. Many databases have mul-
tiple columns of numerical data. For example, in the census
database, there may be age, salary, zip code, etc. The data
becomes increasingly sparse as the number of dimensions gets
larger. Matching every single column separately will yield far
from optimal results.
All our algorithms are still valid in this setting, where P and
Q are points in Rd for a constant d, d ≥ 3. However, the (worst-
case) guarantees and running time of the monotone-greedy
algorithm degrade. Since the longest monotone sequence of
a set of n points in Rd is Θ(n1/d), we are only guaranteed
a matching of weight ≥ opt/n1/d, where opt is the optimum
weight order-preserving matching.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we use both synthetic data and real-world
datasets to evaluate the performance of our matching algorithms
and attack effectiveness.
A. Data Sources
Synthetic Data Generation. The synthetic data is generated in
the following manner. Let R be a set of uniformly distributed
points in a 2-D area. Here R is a superset of the data. Then, for
every r ∈ R assign a point weight f ′(r), which is a uniformly
distributed pseudo-random integer on the interval [fmin, fmax].
Let P denote the auxiliary/plaintext dataset and let Q denote
the target/ciphertext dataset. P and Q are generated as follows.
For the case of Q being a subset of P : copy R into P , and
then generate Q from R with the following sampling process.
For each r ∈ R, we randomly and independently copy it as a
point q ∈ Q with probability β ∈ (0, 1). And if r was copied
to a point q ∈ Q, then the frequency f ′(q) is assigned to
be a binomial variable with probability pbion and expectation
f ′(r) · pbion. For the other case that P intersects with Q, we
sample the points of both P and Q from R randomly and
independently with probability β, and similarly the weight of
copied points are both sampled from a binomial distribution
with probability pbion. Finally, the integer point weights are
normalized to frequency for P and Q in both cases, e.g.
f(p) = f
′(p)∑
p′∈P f ′(p′)
,∀p ∈ P .
The rationale of point frequency following a binomial distri-
bution is that, in the real-world, the set of people who appear in
one dataset may choose to be present or not in another dataset
independently at random, e.g., Uber users can be regarded as
randomly sampled from a USGS/census location database.
Real-world Data Sources. We use three real-world datasets to
evaluate the performance of algorithms, and we start with the
location check-in data from the social networking application
Brightkite [29]. The location coordinates are expressed in
latitude and longitude. We extract the records in a certain area
(latitude: [37.700887, 37.826664], longitude: [-122.512317, -
122.386762]), and take the data collected from Apr. 2008 to
Apr. 2009 as the auxiliary (unencrypted) dataset while the data
from Sep. 2009 to Sep. 2010 as the target (encrypted) dataset.
We randomly choose 500 and 300 points from the reference and
target datasets as P and Q to perform the matching. Then we
process the data in P and Q by discretizing it into location grids
whose granularity is tunable, which means we reserve certain
number of digits after the decimal point to represent that grid.
For example, if we reserve three digits (0.001 as unit grid length
which is approximately 0.1 km in the real-world), there are 399
and 247 points in auxiliary and target datasets respectively. Note
that we do not need to actually encrypt the target dataset in our
evaluation since it does not change the matching result, as we
only use the order and frequency information of the points.
We also use the city and town population totals for the US
estimated by the United States Census Bureau [30]. To get the
location information, we choose the 313 cities with latitude
and longitude provided by Wikipedia [31] (excluding Jurupa
Valley), associating with 2010 census data as the auxiliary
dataset P . And we sample 180 cities, combining with the
corresponding 2018 estimated population data to get the target
dataset Q. Each city record has two dimensional location data,
namely x and y coordinates representing latitude and longitude,
with its population as frequency.
In addition to location datasets, we also evaluate our attacks
in the context of medical data. We leverage a patient discharge
dataset, which contains the distribution of inpatient discharges
by principal diagnosis group for each California hospital [32].
We randomly sample the records collected in 2009 and 2014
as the auxiliary dataset and target dataset. More specifically,
we select the numerical facility ID as the x coordinate. For
the y coordinate, we convert the categorical diagnosis result
to numerical data by assigning a specific diagnosis group to
a numeric number. The frequency of each facility-diagnose
pair is the recorded number of patients. There are overall 448
facilities in the original dataset, we first sample 30 of them
as the facilities in P , and then sample 20 out of these 30
samples as facilities in Q. Then we extract the diagnosis and
number of patients of the selected facilities to get y coordinate
and frequency. At the end, we obtain 425 records in auxiliary
dataset P and 272 records in target dataset Q.
B. Evaluation Metrics
For a given ciphertext record c = JmK and its plaintext m,
the attack algorithm matches c to a corresponding plaintext as
m′ which might be different from m. We say c is correctly
matched iff m′ = m. Note that, when P intersects with Q, for
a ciphertext c = JmK ∈ Q, its plaintext m may or may not be
in the set P . Hence we define the record set of ciphertexts and
plaintexts as Qr and Pr by: Qr = {c ∈ Q|c = JmK,m ∈ P},
Pr = {m ∈ P |JmK ∈ Q}. Define Iij = 1 if point pi is correctly
matched to point qj , where (pi, qj) is a plaintext-ciphertext
pair; Iij = 0 otherwise. We will use the following metrics for
performance evaluation:
1) Point recovery rate:
∑j=|Q|
j=1 Iij/|Q|.
2) Record recovery rate (ratio of people in correctly matched
locations):
j=|Q|∑
j=1
fjIij/
i=|Q|∑
i=1
fi.
3) Normalized objective, defined as the objective of an al-
gorithm divided by the optimal ILP solution, which is
to evaluate how far the algorithm is from the optimal
objective function in the ILP formulation.
Note that there is an upper bound (the best one can do) of the
recovery ratio. In the case of Q is a subset of P , the upper
bound is 1; in the case of Q intersects with P , the upper
bound is: |Qr| / |Q| for metric (1), and
∑
i∈Qr
fi for metric (2).
To remove the impact of the size of the intersection, we use
normalized recovery rate by dividing the recovery ratios with
its upper bound in this paper.
Besides, we found that the data density and the similarity
of the frequency distributions for 1-D and 2-D data are two
factors that have significant impact on algorithm performance,
we define the following metrics to quantify them:
1) Overlap ratio: the ratio of distinct records of ciphertext in
Q to plaintext in P . For 2-D data, it is |Qr| / |P |, for 1-D
data, e.g. it is |Qrx | / |Px| on x-axis, where |Qrx | and
|Px| are the number of unique x coordinates in Qr and P
respectively. If we define the data density as the ratio of
distinct points in Q against total points in the domain of all
possible plaintexts, then the overlap ratio can be regarded
as the effective data density, and when this ratio is small,
the data is also sparse.
2) Overall frequency similarity: denote the union of points
in P and Q as R. For a point r in R, its frequency
on P is defined as the frequency of the corresponding
point if it appears in P , otherwise is 0. In this way,
we get the frequency distribution of all these points on
P and Q as f(p) =
(
f(p1), · · · , f(pk)
)
and f(q) =(
f(q1), · · · , f(qk)
)
. The overall frequency similarity of P
and Q defined with Hellinger distance is:
H
(
f(p), f(q)
)
=
1√
2
√√√√ k∑
i=1
(√
f(pi)−
√
f(qi)
)2
For Hellinger distance, we have 0 ≤ H(f(p), f(q)) ≤ 1,
and when H
(
f(p), f(q)
)
is greater, the larger overall
distance is between two distributions, and the less the
similarity is.
Also, we would like to compare the performance with a
direct extension of the 1-D matching algorithm in [14] to 2-D
data in the following way. We separately use the 1-D matching
algorithm on each of the dimensions (x or y coordinates), with
the order of x (or y) and marginal frequency of each x (or y)
coordinate. For a point (cx, cy) in the target dataset, let mx
and my be the matched coordinates respectively, then we let
(mx,my) as the matched point for (cx, cy). Denote the point
recovery rate of the 1-D matching on x and y coordinates as
rx and ry , then for the point recovery rate on 2-D data r we
have r ≤ min{rx, ry}.
C. Experimental Results for Synthetic Data
We implemented our proposed algorithms in Matlab, and all
the experiments are run on a HPC cluster with 28 cores and
168GB memory. We first simulate with synthetic data, where
we consider two cases: Q is a subset of P , and Q intersects
with P . For each case, we generate 30 different datasets, and
under each dataset, we evaluate the algorithm performance with
the two weight functions defined in Sec. 4.1.
1) Synthetic Data, Case 1: Q is a subset of P : In this case,
we set P = R, |P | = 60, Q is obtained from P with the data
generation method described above, where β = 0.6, pbion =
0.7. Results are shown in Fig. 2 (a)-(b), where “mix” means
we find both increasing and decreasing monotonic matchings,
and iteratively select the better one. We can see that the weight
function 1 and 2 result in similar performance for all the 2-
D algorithms, except that solution to ILP is the best (but also
takes much more time, as shown in the right y axis). In this case
the min-conflict algorithm outperforms all the other monotone
sequences based algorithms under both weight functions. This
is because the datasets are pretty similar. In addition, our 2-D
matching algorithms significantly outperform the extended 1-D
algorithm (about 10%) since our algorithms take into account
the order of x and y axis simultaneously.
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Fig. 2: Synthetic data: point recovery rate (rpoint), record re-
covery rate (rrecord) and objective (bar, left y axis), and running
time in seconds (line, right y axis).
2) Synthetic Data, Case 2: P intersects with Q: In this
case, we set |R| = 100, and both P and Q are obtained
from R with the data generation method above, where β and
pbion are same as case 1. Besides, about 60% of points in P
and Q are common. The average normalized recovery rates
(point or record) of each algorithm among 30 runs are shown
in Fig. 2 (c)-(d). Still, both weight functions have similar
performance. And also the monotone-sequence-based algorithm
and the min-conflict algorithm have comparable performance.
In addition, the normalized objectives are still close to that
of the ILP solution (> 60%). Compared with case 1, in case
2 the normalized recovery rates are slightly lower for all the
algorithms, since the two datasets are less similar and are more
noisy.
D. Experimental Results on Real-world Datasets
We also evaluate our matching algorithms on the real-world
datasets described at the beginning of this section. As the
results in Sec. VII-C show that the two weight functions have
comparable performance, we only apply the weight function
(2) on real-world datasets. For the monotone based greedy
algorithms, we use either increasing or decreasing order, but
only show the best results among them and refer it as the
monotone solution.
1) Location-based Brightkite Check-ins: The recovery rate
of point and record with different matching algorithms are
shown in Fig. 3 (a), we can see that the finer the granularity is,
the lower the recovery rate we get. And when we have a coarse
granularity, e.g. when 3 digits reserved, the points on 1-D are
much denser, and also the frequency distributions are more
similar (as shown in Table I), so the extended 1-D algorithm
outperforms our 2-D algorithms. However, as the granularity
becomes finer, the points are sparser and the frequencies are
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Fig. 3: Brightkite: (a) point and record recovery rate; (b)
distribution of locations when reserve 4 digits
less similar, then the monotone matching algorithm performs
the best. Note the lower recovery rate for finer granularity.
This is because the algorithm relies on the frequency difference
between two points, and both the ciphertext and plaintext’s fre-
quency distributions become more homogeneous under higher
granularity, which increases the ambiguity in weighted match-
ing (inclined to be unweighted). The solution to ILP should
give us the actual optimal result, but unfortunately, since there
are too many constraints in ILP, we cannot get its solution in
time.
TABLE I: Effective data density and Hellinger distance for
Brightkite
Reserved digits Effective data density Hellinger distance
(x, y) x y (x, y) x y
3 0.2807 0.8125 0.7283 0.5885 0.1786 0.2228
4 0.1869 0.4595 0.4053 0.6393 0.6837 0.4773
5 0.1740 0.2120 0.2 0.6493 0.6214 0.6340
2) City and Town Population: The matching results are
given in Table II, where the monotone matching yields a
slightly lower recovery rate than the min-conflict algorithm, but
better performance than the extended 1-D algorithm. Similarly,
we compute the Hellinger distance (frequency similarity) and
effective data density. It turns out that these two values on 2-
D and 1-D data are the same, which are 0.5241 and 0.5751
respectively. This is because all the x and y coordinates are
unique, so as to the (x, y) data. Hence, in this case for
the extended 1-D algorithm and 2-D algorithms, the effects
of the data density and frequency distribution are the same,
the recovery rate here is decided by the advantage of the
algorithm itself. The 2-D algorithms outperform the extended 1-
D algorithm on inference against 2-D OPE databases because
we jointly consider the data orders on x and y coordinates.
And we use an extreme case in Fig. 4 to show the benefits of
considering data orders in 2D.
TABLE II: Results for city and town population dataset
Algorithm Recovery rate Runtime (s)Point Record
1-D 0 0 11.8830
Min-conf. 0.3778 0.3653 264.0576
Monotone 0.25 0.2631 309.6281
3) Patient Discharge Data by Principal Diagnosis: We show
the results of patient discharge data in Table III, where the
monotone matching yields very high recovery rates. But it is
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Fig. 4: 1D-matching of [14] vs. 2D-matching. Most points in
P have frequency = 0, or do not appear in Q. These elements
are represented by dots. Each block in P is associated with a
unique permutation of (1, 2, 3). In Q, only one of these 6 blocks
appear. Obviously the 2-D data uniquely indicates which blocks
of P is isomorphic to Q, and (if only blocks are considered),
this block is revealed as the unique optimal solution to the order-
preserving matching. On the other hand, the sum of each row and
column are identical, so no meaningful 1-D matching is possible.
By replacing 3 by an arbitrary d, we indicate that no less than d!
false matching are possible.
surprising that the min-conflict algorithm yields zero recovery
rates, even worse than the extended 1-D algorithm. First we
observe that for the adopted dataset, the set of y coordinates of
the auxiliary and target datasets are the same, which correspond
to 19 principal diagnosis groups (hence the data density on y-
axis is 1 in Table IV), and this results in an exact matching on
y-axis for all the algorithms. Then the recovery rate is decided
by the matching on x-axis, which means the 2-D order cannot
benefit 2-D algorithms much. Hence in this case the noisy data
frequency has a greater impact on the min-conflict algorithm,
which leads to poor performance.
TABLE III: Matching results for patient discharge data
Reserved digits Recovery rate Runtime (s)Point Record
1-D 0.0684 0.0290 0.249
Min-conf. 0 0 517.9117
Monotone 0.8441 0.8995 196.3670
TABLE IV: Effective data density and Hellinger distance for
patient discharge data
Effective data density Hellinger distance
(x, y) x y (x, y) x y
0.6188 0.6667 1 0.3798 0.1665 0.0960
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the problem of inferring data
from OPE-encrypted databases by jointly considering the multi-
dimensional order and frequency of data tuples. We formulate
it as a multi-dimensional matching problem, prove the NP-
hardness, and propose efficient algorithms to solve it. Our
algorithms exploit the geometric structure of the problem.
We show that the monotone matching could be obtained
in asymptotic time O(n2.5 log3 n) that is comparable to the
O(n2) 1-D algorithm. A simpler greedy algorithm is also
provided. Experimental results on synthetic and real-world
datasets show that our algorithms perform better than the
extended 1-D algorithm when the data is sparse. In addition,
the performance gain depends on data density and similarity
of frequency distributions, but 2-D matching is more robust to
noise (or dissimilarities between the frequency distributions).
Our algorithms shed more light on the security evaluation of
OPE encrypted databases.
Extensions and Future Directions: Our experiments indicate
that 1-D matching algorithm is likely to cluster the data into
meaningful regions, and match region in an order-preserving
way, using the aggregated data in each region. We think cluster-
ing could average/smooth the impact of noise, downsize the size
of the problem, and circumvent issues when the datasets use
different scale of coordinates, hence we would like to combine
clustering with monotone matching algorithms. Clustering the
plaintext P could be obtained based on geographic/geometric
vicinity in a straightforward way, thus we assume it is given in
the rest for simplicity. However, finding corresponding regions
in the ciphertext Q is not obvious, as distances are distorted.
Furthermore, finding these clusters cannot be decoupled from
the matching process. We have obtained some preliminary
results and we briefly describe them here. For any two rect-
angles R1, R2 the cost of matching the point of P inside R1
to points of Q inside R2 depends on the difference between
their corresponding sum of frequencies in each rectangle. Our
optimization function is to simultaneously obtain a clustering of
Q and an one-to-one order-preserving matching to P ’s cluster.
The 1-D problem can easily be solved in time O(n2), using
dynamic programming. This leads to an O(n5) algorithm for
the 2-D problem for matching monotonic set of points in P to
a weakly-monotonic set of rectangles in Q. We omit details due
to lack of space. Testing the effectiveness of these approaches
is left for future work.
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